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T

he drone debate continues hot and heavy. Critical issues range
from the morality of targeting choices and concerns about unintended casualties and anti-Americanism to matters of legal and
bureaucratic oversight.1 These are pressing questions; the United States’
use of drones as a weapon of war is on the rise, and other countries are
interested in acquiring them.2
Less often raised are first-order questions, or examinations of
first principles. These questions consider the fundamental nature of a
concept or a tool.3 This article poses basic questions about the use of
drone strikes as tools of the state. My goal is to spark further analysis of
drone strikes as an instrument in the US foreign policy tool kit. I ask how
drones compare to other weapons and what they may be able to achieve
tactically and strategically, militarily and politically. These are also questions worth considering in the context of how other states’ acquisition of
armed drones could affect the United States. In addition, I identify major
unanswered empirical questions about the outcome of drone strikes.
There is still a lack of empirical evidence about the effects of drone
strikes, partly due to the secrecy of US drone programs and partly due
to their relative novelty. But even without that research, it is possible to
consider the utility of drones in attempts to increase US security.
Some of these questions may seem to have obvious answers, but
for those who suggest there is broad agreement in the public debate on
first-order questions and first principles regarding drone strikes, I offer
the contrasting positions of The New Yorker editor David Remnick and
retired Air Force General Charles Dunlap. Remnick states, “We are in
the same position now, with drones, that we were with nuclear weapons
in 1945. For the moment, we are the only ones with this technology that
is going to change the morality, psychology, and strategic thinking of
warfare for years to come.” Dunlap says, “It’s not particularly new to
use long-range strike. David defeated Goliath with a long-range strike
1     Sara Kreps and John Kaag, “The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Contemporary Conflict:
A Legal and Ethical Analysis,” Polity 44, no. 2 (April 2012): 260-285; Benjamin H. Friedman, “Nobody
Knows if Drone Strikes in Pakistan Work,” The National Interest, August 17, 2012, http://nationalinterest.org; Sarah Waheed, “Drones, U.S. Propaganda and Imperial Hubris,” Middle East Research and
Information Project, January 25, 2013, http://www.merip.org; Room for Debate, “Do Drone Attacks
Do More Harm Than Good?,” The New York Times online, September 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.
com; C. Christine Fair et al., “You Say the Pakistanis All Hate the Drone War? Prove It,” The Atlantic,
January 23, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com; Jack Goldsmith, “Drone Stories, the Secrecy System,
and Public Accountability,” Lawfare, May 31, 2012, http://www.lawfareblog.com; Christopher Swift,
“The Drone Blowback Fallacy,” Foreign Affairs online, July 1, 2012, http://christopher-swift.com.
2     Greg Miller, “Under Obama, an Emerging Global Apparatus for Drone Killing,” The Washington
Post, December 27, 2011; Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Pursues Sale of Armed Drones,”
The Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2011.
3     Oxford Dictionaries defines first principles as “the fundamental concepts or assumptions on
which a theory, system, or method is based.” (Oxford University Press, April 2010).
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with a missile weapon. At Agincourt, the English bowmen destroyed
the flower of the French knighthood with long-range strikes . . . and we
have had long-range strike bombers for some time. This really is not
new conceptually."4
This article considers the goal of US drone programs to be greater
security for the United States and its friends and allies. Caveat: There are
analysts thinking about a future of stand-off, plugged-in warfare. I make
a more modest effort to consider what drone strikes may achieve in fundamental political terms as a forceful tool of the state. I also bracket issues
of morality, legality, budgeting, and bureaucratic oversight. Answering
practical questions requires understanding what states can do and want to
do with drones, politically and militarily. Investigation into the morality
of drone strikes is contingent on what states expect drone strikes to
achieve and how those drones are deployed. Striking only targets in the
act of mounting an attack on the US homeland, for example, presents
different moral questions than so-called “signature strikes” against
unidentified individuals judged to be behaving suspiciously.5
The first core question is whether drones are a unique weapon and
whether they provide distinct advantages or disadvantages over other
weapons. I categorize drones as a form of air power based on the following logic and evidence, which I detail expecting disagreement will
advance the analysis. Like piloted armed aircraft, armed drones provide
information as well as strike capacity. They can achieve a variety of military effects, as other air platforms can. They can kill, disable, support
fighters on the ground, destroy, harry, hinder, deny access, observe, and
track. Like pilots providing close air support, firing missiles, or dropping bombs, drone operators are expected to respect the laws of war,
striking based on clear information, including assessment of potential
human costs.
Drones provide several advantages over manned armed flights and
sea-based launches. They are claimed to do less collateral damage than
either missiles or manned aerial bombing; they can hover overhead for
relatively long periods of time to gather information for a strike (up to
14 hours); they can strike quickly, and the missile can be diverted from
its original target in an intentional miss.6 They are also less expensive
than manned platforms. Unlike other delivery systems, however, they
require a permissive environment, which is likely to limit their utility in
some theaters.
Drones, like other air and sea platforms, are a form of power projection. They give the United States the ability to mount tactical assaults
without necessarily putting US personnel directly in harm’s way, potentially evoking domestic opposition. They also allow the United States to
avoid putting its forces in foreign territory, potentially eliciting a nationalistic response. Drones are similar to Special Forces in their direct
4     David Carr, “Debating Drones, In the Open,” The New York Times, February 10, 2014; “Does
U.S. Drone Use Set a New Precedent for War?” PBS NewsHour, October 10, 2011.
5     Scott Shane, “Elections Spur a Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy,” The New York Times,
November 24, 2012.
6     Micah Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign Relations Special Report
No. 65, January 2013; Retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, “Drones Best Weapons We’ve Got for
Accuracy, Control, Oversight; Critics Don’t Get It,” defense.AOL.com, February 14, 2013, http://
defense.aol.com/2013/02/15/retired-gen-deputula-drones-best-weapons-weve-got-for-accurac.
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targeting ability, but they can reach remote locations and, again, do not
place US troops directly in peril. Nevertheless, drone strikes do require
cooperation by individuals and states on the ground. The United States
needs, for example, basing rights, agreements to host launch and recovery personnel and search-and-rescue teams, and overflight permissions.7
A significant concern raised in the public debate is that drones make
killing too easy. This is a critical issue that connects to questions about
US grand strategy and whether drones encourage imperial overreach.8
But because the United States uses a variety of tools to conduct targeted
killings—from the Special Forces raid on Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani
compound to the missile strike on Dora Farms, where Saddam Hussein
and his sons were believed to be sheltering early in the Iraq War—I
suggest there is more to gain analytically by first focusing on understanding the tactic, that is, what targeted killing may and may not achieve as
a foreign policy tool, then addressing concerns specific to the platform.9
The second core question pertains to the strategic utility of drone
strikes for a state. What political goals can drone strikes achieve? In
considering this question, I use a theoretical prism that identifies the
fundamental political goals of the state’s use of force to defend, deter,
compel, and, sometimes, swagger.10
It is possible to consider targeted killings, specifically those conducted
by drones, as an element in a defensive strategy. This strategy would be
intended to ward off attack and reduce possible damage by killing leaders
and facilitators plotting violence against the United States, and disrupting
their operations. It is also possible to argue targeted killings deter future
attacks by denying armed groups the capability to conduct those attacks,
and punishing those planning violence against the United States and its
interests. The deterrence-by-denial argument requires consideration not
only of targeted killings but also drone strikes to directly degrade targeted
groups’ capabilities in other ways (e.g., cause equipment and supply shortages, operational and strategic paralysis, and disruption of operations).
Drone strikes in this analysis might also deter cooperation with a group
based on fear or doubt about the group’s likely success.11
It is harder to argue that targeted killings might exercise a compelling effect by threatening greater pain if the targeted organization does

7      Ibid., 7.
8     Derek Gregory has argued, for example, that the United States is using drone strikes much as
the British used air power in consolidating their control over the empire in the late 19th century and
the 20th century to World War II, “From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War,” Theory,
Culture & Society 28:7-8 (2011), 188-215.
9     More broadly, Micah Zenko, Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the
Post-Cold War World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), considers drone strikes as a type
of discrete military operation, “a single or serial physical use of kinetic military force to achieve a
defined military and political goal by inflicting casualties or causing destruction, without seeking to
conquer an opposing army or capture or control territory,” 2.
10     Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security 4 (Spring 1980): 4-35.
11     Robert Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 55-86. John
Brennan told the Senate Intelligence Committee in hearings on his nomination to head the CIA that
the United States uses drone strikes to deter terrorist attacks, not to punish those who commit them.
Kimberley Dozier, “CIA Chief Nominee: Drones Only a Deterrent,” The Associated Press, MSN.
com, February 7, 2013, http://news.msn.com/politics/cia-chief-nominee-drones-only-a-deterrent.
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not change its behavior.12 Successful compellence requires displaying
to the adversary the will and capability to cause terrible pain if the
adversary does not change its behavior. The ethical and legal context
of drone use by the United States make it unlikely at first glance that
policymakers would choose to use drone strikes to cause pain to an
adversary by deliberately targeting innocents. In terms of causing pain
to the adversary directly, the death or threat of death to a plotter is an
organization’s cost of doing business, not a taste of suffering to come if
it does not change its behavior.13
There are several other possible strategic effects of drone strikes.
Swaggering, here displaying US military power and its seemingly effortless global reach, arguably demonstrates resolve, a quality that has been
underlined as an element of US counterterrorism policy.14 Drone strikes
can also be seen as the straightforward use of brute force to destroy those
who would threaten the United States or its allies.15 In addition, they are
an alliance tool supporting other states, such as Yemen and Pakistan.
It is an open question whether all drone strikes can be expected to
have the same political effects at all times and in all places. If a drone
strike was politically ineffective in Yemen in 2002, there is reason to
investigate whether it will be politically effective in Yemen, Pakistan,
or Somalia today, or in Mali, Syria, or the Philippines tomorrow.16 This
possibility suggests the importance of considering drone strikes in their
political context. This context may include, for example, theaters where
the United States is at war, theaters in which it is not, theaters in which
the United States has national or international permission to strike, theaters in which it does not, and so on. A matrix of types of targets and
expected effects would be useful. There may also be interactions among
these factors that shape the political effects of drone strikes.
The questions and theoretical answers posited here require empirical
investigation. Many good minds are already at work, and more evidence
should become available as time passes and, perhaps, as the United States
makes its drone programs more transparent. Critical questions include
whether drone strikes or targeted killings prevent or drive attacks on
the US homeland; whether they reduce or increase attacks on US forces
and interests elsewhere; whether they buttress client states, provoke

12     Vikash Yadav suggests the U.S. military has used drones to compel a change of behavior
by the Pakistani military rather than to change the behavior of targeted groups directly, “North
Waziristan: Drones and Compellence,” Duck of Minerva, April 30, 2011, http://www.whiteoliphaunt.
com/duckofminerva/2011/04/north-waziristan-drones-and-compellence.html.
13      Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Matthew
Kroenig and Barry Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 35:2 (Spring 2012):
21-36, discuss terrorism and deterrence more broadly; Job C. Henning, “Embracing the Drone,”
The New York Times, February 20, 2012, urges US adoption of a more transparent doctrine of
deterrence by drone.
14     Audrey Kurth Cronin, “U.S. Grand Strategy and Counterterrorism,” Orbis (Spring 2012): 1-23,
notes the George W. Bush administration’s concern with resolve after the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.
15     Justin Elliot, “Have U.S. Drones Become a ‘Counterinsurgency Air Force’ For Our
Allies?” ProPublica, November 27, 2012. http://www.propublica.org/article/have-u.s.-dronesbecome-a-counterinsurgency-air-force-for-our-allies; Jackie Northam, “Pakistan Says U.S.
Drone Strikes Violate Its Sovereignty,” NPR, February 7, 2013, notes that the Pakistani government is widely considered to support US drone strikes in private while using them as a tool to
whip up anti-American sentiment publically, http://www.npr.org/2013/02/07/171413259/
pakistan-says-u-s-drone-strikes-violate-its-sovereignty.
16     Zenko, Between Threats and War, 88-89.
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upheaval, or hasten a client’s fall; and whether drone strikes increase
radicalization and also anti-Americanism, or other forms of terrorism.
These questions are not unique to drones. They bear directly on the
need for a counterterrorism strategy that begins by identifying critical
US interests and threats, then systematically sorts through a realistic
consideration of ends, ways, and means. This analysis requires answering first-order questions and identifying first principles while fostering
rigorous research into the actual effects of drone strikes on US and
international security.

